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Abstract
Since early studies of allegory by Buffière and Pépin, and J. Coulter's groundbreaking work on the
Neoplatonists, a number of important studies have been published on Neoplatonic literary theory, including
those by A. Sheppard, R. Lamberton, and J. Whitman.1 Oiva Kuisma has produced a further contribution to
this growing area of study.
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 Atius. This choice was made complicated not only by the gross differences between
 the intellectually complex style of Theophrastus and the telegraphic reports charac-
 teristic of Diels' Atius, but more mundanely by the fact that Aetius had a lot to
 say about philosophy in the first two centuries after Theophrastus' death. And so
 Diels postulated an intermediate source for Aetius, the Vetusta Placita, which incor-
 porated much material on Hellenistic philosophy. In the present volume M. and R.
 have little to say about Aetius' predecessors, and in their stemma (p. 328) they refer
 only to the "anterior tradition." But what they do say and what they have said else-
 where indicates that they will give us a much richer account than Diels offered, one
 in which Aristotle, and perhaps Hippias of Elis and Plato, will play a much more
 prominent role than they did in the prolegomena, and the intellectual point of col-
 lecting opinions will be much more stressed. It is not clear at this point whether the
 third volume will try to do for Aetius what this one tried to do for his "successors"
 and "neighbors," namely construct a stemma. I, for one, hope not. Much work re-
 mains to be done on the doxographical tradition and its intellectual impact, but this
 book leaves me with the feeling that it will not be done best by focusing on the nec-
 essarily hypothetical reconstruction of a lost work or lost works. The focus seems to
 me better placed on the works we do have, including collections of fragments, their
 place and time, and, where reasonably clear, their interrelationships. M. and R. have
 provided a rich supply of information and suggestions for undertakings of this kind.
 But, although they criticize a number of post-Dox. Graec. editors for uncritical ac-
 ceptance of Diels' Aetius, they also criticize the two twentieth-century editors of the
 Plutarchan epitome for producing a text based almost exclusively on the manuscript
 tradition and failing to "diligently record all significant variants of the entire tradi-
 tion, both direct and indirect, so that P's [the epitome's] tradition is at least present in
 the edition, even if it is impossible to place it all in the text" (p. 181). No doubt such
 an enormous undertaking would be a very useful tool for research, but my inclina-
 tion is to think that the proper starting point for reconstructing the doxographical
 tradition is sound editions of individual texts based on the manuscripts for those
 texts and produced independently of elaborate theories of derivation, interpolation,
 and authorial or scribal error.
 Ian Mueller
 University of Chicago
 Proclus' Defense of Homer. By OIVA KUISMA. Commentationes Humanarum Lit-
 terarum, 109. Helsinki: Societas Scientiarum Fennica, 1996. Pp. 157.
 Since early studies of allegory by Buffiere and Pepin, and J. Coulter's ground-
 breaking work on the Neoplatonists, a number of important studies have been
 published on Neoplatonic literary theory, including those by A. Sheppard, R. Lam-
 berton, and J. Whitman.' Oiva Kuisma has produced a further contribution to this
 growing area of study.
 1. F Buffiere, Les Mythes d'Homere et la pensee grecque (Paris, 1956); J. Pepin, Mythe et allegorie
 (Paris, 1958); J. A. Coulter, The Literary Microcosm: Theories of Interpretation of the Later Neoplatonists,
 Columbia Studies in the Classical Tradition, vol. 2 (Leiden, 1976); A. D. R. Sheppard, Essays on the 5th and
 6th Books of Proclus' "Commentary on the Republic," Hypomnemata 61 (Gottingen, 1980); R. Lamberton,
 Homer the Theologian: Neoplatonist Allegorical Reading and the Growth of the Epic Tradition (Berkeley,
 1986); J. Whitman, Allegory: the Dynamics of an Ancient and Medieval Technique (Cambridge, MA, 1987).
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 The importance of Neoplatonic thought has been well established for over a gen-
 eration. Plotinus' stunning remaking of the ancient thought-world has been granted
 the prominent place it deserves in general treatments of classical philosophy.2 We
 can only hope that general surveys of classical literary commentary will likewise
 take account of the findings made in the last twenty years by the likes of Coulter,
 Sheppard, Lamberton, and now K., and accord the Neoplatonists their place as piv-
 otal thinkers in the history of reading. A few stumbling blocks remain in the way of
 such a development. First, the most important Neoplatonic literary thinking is not
 done by Plotinus. It is done rather by his followers, especially Proclus, whose work
 is oftentimes dry and "scholastic" and occupied with numbingly fine questions of
 ontology. Their work is not as widely translated or studied as that of Plotinus (who
 certainly deserves the lion's share of the generalist's attention).3 Second, and perhaps
 more important, there is a resistance, sometimes a strong resistance, to considering
 the kind of reading that the Neoplatonists do (allegorical commentary) alongside the
 other approaches to ancient reading that are customarily treated under the heading
 of literary criticism. The Neoplatonists, along with the other allegorists, are some-
 times seen as only "using" poetry to pursue their own agendas in philosophy or
 religion.4 While it is surely the case that the Neoplatonists approach a literary text
 with philosophical issues and agendas in mind, it seems odd to remove them on
 these grounds from our most general considerations of ancient approaches to the
 task of reading imaginative literature. By the same rule we might exclude Dionysius
 of Halicarnassus or Quintilian as only "using" the poets to elucidate their primary
 interest, rhetoric. This view also neglects the many allegorists, including Crates,
 Heraclitus the allegorist, Pseudo-Plutarch, and many anonymous scholiasts, who be-
 long to no identifiable "school" of philosophical or religious thought, and apparently
 have no particular philosophical or religious ax to grind. Nevertheless, one hopes
 that historians of criticism need not select their material on the basis of whether an
 ancient reader reads according to some modern definition of accuracy. Finally, fol-
 lowing on the previous point, the Neoplatonists are sometimes said not to be inter-
 ested in the literary text as a specifically literary text. This may be true if one defines
 "literariness" in the way, say, Aristotle did. But readers have never reached general
 agreement over how one should define such a thing; if they had, we would not have
 competing schools of literary theory. Surprisingly, considering the pervasiveness of
 the opposing view, many (one could even say most) of the allegorists give genuine
 2. The work of A. H. Armstrong is most important in this regard. See, for example, The Cambridge
 History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy (New York, 1967), 195-269, where Plotinus is the
 only individual figure accorded a full "part" in the eight-part volume on the period.
 3. Proclus' Commentary on the Republic, which contains the most thorough surviving statements of Neo-
 platonic literary theory, awaits a published translation. Porphyry's short essay On the Cave of the Nymphs is
 an exception to the rule, and has been widely disseminated, with a few breaks, since the Renaissance. The
 most recent translation was produced by Lamberton (Barrytown, NY, 1983).
 4. This view is pervasive. See, for example, G. Kennedy, Cambridge History of Literary Criticism, vol. 1,
 Classical Criticism (New York, 1989), 86, where allegory is cast as a "tool" of philosophical and religious
 rhetoric; D. A. Russell, Criticism in Antiquity (Berkeley, 1981), 42, where the Stoic allegorists are said to
 "use" poetry as a propaedeutic for philosophy, and 95, where allegory is said to "have to do more with the
 history of religion and ethics than with that of literary criticism"; G. M. A. Grube, The Greek and Roman
 Critics (Cambridge, 1968), 55-56, where the allegorists are said to "use" the poets as authorities "for their
 own ideas"; and finally, M. B. Trapp, "Allegory," OCD3 (1997), 64.
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 care and attention to what (by their own lights) are the unique properties of fictive
 literature.5
 If we broaden our most general accounts of the history of criticism to include the
 Neoplatonists and earlier allegorists like the Derveni commentator, Chrysippus,
 Cornutus, Heraclitus, and Pseudo-Plutarch, we would disprove certain truisms that
 still linger around the field, such as that classical readers are interested primarily in
 analyzing the effect of a poem on an audience, emphasize formalist and stylistic ap-
 proaches, produce a criticism that focuses on composition, and generally use tools
 and methods that were developed for the analysis of public speeches.6 Such a move
 would balance the Aristotelian and rhetorical emphases that have guided the impor-
 tant work done in the field in the last few decades.7 The Neoplatonists, and earlier
 allegorists, show us that not only rhetoric but also other areas of knowledge, like
 philosophy, divination, theology, and magic, informed ancient approaches to the task
 of reading a literary text. Until such time as their work is situated in the broader con-
 texts of classical literary commentary, the Neoplatonists will remain something of
 an exotic curiosity, and K. situates the material this way.
 Proclus (410/12-485 C.E.), the last of the great Neoplatonists, produced the
 school's most detailed and ambitious theories and interpretations of poetry. In the
 course of his literary thinking, he entered the nettlesome problem of Plato's charges
 against Homer and, like a number of critics before and after him, he tried to recon-
 cile the two. K. chooses this as the point of entry into a wider consideration of Pro-
 clus' contributions to ancient criticism.
 K. rightly places the category of the symbol at the center of Proclus' thinking on
 literature, and in the first chapter examines the background for Neoplatonic symbol-
 ism. After a brief treatment of the Pythagorean contributions to the Neoplatonists'
 symbol, K. finds the roots of the "symbolic" mode of thinking within Plato's phi-
 losophy. Plato's theory of ideas, his critical attitude toward written language, and his
 use of myths in the dialogues, K. claims, nurture a philosophy of the unseen, where
 one is obliged by the inadequacies of language to resort to reasoning by analogy, and
 where real truth lies in a realm that cannot be fully captured in mundane things, but
 lies always just beyond them. While it is certainly true that these features of Plato's
 thinking encourage a certain figurative stance toward the world by suggesting that
 the things we see are only reflections and shadows of hidden realities that underlie
 them, this leaves us a good deal short of the conception of the "symbolic" as the
 5. Commentators as various in their skills, motivations, and approaches as the Derveni commentator
 (c. 400 B.C.E.), Cleanthes (331-233 B.C.E.), Cornutus (first century C.E.), Pseudo-Plutarch (first century
 C.E.), Porphyry (234-c. 305), and Proclus (410/12-485 C.E.) repeat a more or less consistent view that
 great literature's defining property is an extreme density of meaning, often derived from divine inspiration
 (at several removes in the case of Cornutus), which makes it uniquely able to convey the most profound
 truths the universe has to offer, about the cosmos, the gods, and the nature of human beings. They develop
 their diverse strategies of reading from this generally consistent theoretical starting point. In my view, this
 stance answers Aristotle's theory that literature is first and foremost a TgXV1, the examples of which should
 be measured against a set of "natural" specifications such as genre, levels of style, schemes of tropes, etc.
 Aristotle's great poet is a master-craftsman, while the allegorists' great poet is a master-riddler and savant.
 This opposition between poet as craftsman and poet as inspired savant is already fully operative in Plato's
 Ion. (See P. Murray, introduction to Plato On Poetry, ed. P. Murray [New York, 1996], 6-12.)
 6. See, for example, D. A. Russell, "Literary Criticism in Antiquity," OCD3(1997), 869-71.
 7. G. Kennedy has done the most to illuminate this tradition of ancient criticism. See, for example,
 G. A. Kennedy, Cambridge History of Literary Criticism, vol. 1, Classical Criticism (New York, 1989).
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 later Neoplatonists envision it. The symbol carries a heady ontological resonance,
 which K. elsewhere acknowledges, that Plato would have found hardly serious
 enough for a sincere rebuttal. Proclus' symbol not only represents its referent, but it
 actually reproduces it, in an arcane and mysterious way. Like a voodoo doll, it car-
 ries an actual ontological trace of the thing to which it refers, and becomes a pars
 pro toto.8 Perhaps it is better to say that Plato's role in producing the symbol is lim-
 ited to establishing the conditions of epistemological and ontological gap, or even
 rupture, which the Neoplatonic symbol is meant to overcome.
 A second chapter introduces some welcome consideration of Proclus' life, for
 which our only source is the legendary account of his devoted student Marinus. K.
 rightly relies on Marinus' hagiographic account to establish the sense among the
 later Neoplatonists that they lived in a cosmos saturated with hidden correspon-
 dences and arcane meanings. Events never just "happened." They had a tale to tell,
 since everything in the Neoplatonic world was connected by means of divine sympa-
 thy and providence to every other thing. One only needed to learn the great code that
 underlay all visible things. Dreams, omens, and oracles abounded and begged for
 interpretation, which the diligent philosopher provided.
 The third chapter is K.'s strongest, providing a synthetic accounting of the onto-
 logical and semiotic dimensions of Proclus' world. After Plotinus, the Neoplatonists
 understood the universe to be a great emanation or outpouring from the One, the
 utterly transcendent source of all that is. Everything that exists carries some trace,
 however faint, of its transcendent source. As K. explains, this ontology provided
 uniquely fertile ground for semiotics. The material things we see are not just the
 shadowy appearances that, according to Plato, always threaten to mislead us. For the
 good Neoplatonist, material objects always have the potential to be manifestations,
 revelations of the whole ontic superstructure of which they are only the basest indi-
 cation, like the tips of so many icebergs of being. By the time of Proclus, the Neo-
 platonists had achieved a somewhat detailed picture of the way the universe was
 arranged. Like rays from the sun, chains of being stretched out from the One and
 penetrated down through the various strata of the cosmic hierarchy. At the upper lev-
 els of being, right below the One itself, a ray manifested itself as an Olympian god.
 This very same beam manifested different things as it shone through the levels of the
 divine Mind, the divine Soul, and the encosmic levels that housed the daemons, he-
 roes, humans, animals, plants, and matter. The basest material things, then, have hard
 links in their very being to higher-order daemonic, psychical, intellectual, and even
 divine entities. Proclus usually reserves the term "symbolic" to label the kinds of
 semiotic connections that exist along these pathways of emanation.
 K. mentions, but without sufficient emphasis, that the notion of symbolic connec-
 tion is reinforced for Proclus by his religious practices, which K. is readier to label
 magic than is Proclus himself. In the major theoretical statements of his notion of
 the symbol, Proclus explicitly ties the literary "symbol" to another sort of thing that
 the Neoplatonists called a "symbol"-a ritual token used to bring the full presence
 of a god into a devotional statue.9 Proclus and all the Neoplatonists after lamblichus,
 believed in a liturgical component to their spiritual exercises. They intended it as a
 8. On theurgy in Proclus, see A. Sheppard, "Proclus' Attitude to Theurgy," CQ 32, 1 (1982): 212-24.
 9. E.g., at In R. 1.78-79, 1.109-14, 2.241-42; Plat. Theol. 1.29; In Cra. 51, 71.
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 supplement to Plotinus' strategy of pure contemplation. In the theurgic rite, the cele-
 brant invokes the actual presence of the divinity by means of a material token, usu-
 ally called the ov,u,okov or ot3v0r,a. This token, which was a rock, gem, plant, or
 herb, was thought to exist at the end of a long ontological chain, which was linked
 through various levels of reality to a divine being at the other end. After a proper
 ritual, the actual divine presence entered the token and the statue into which it was
 inserted.10 K. mentions, once more without sufficient emphasis, Proclus' reliance on
 this hieratic paradigm in constructing his theories of the poetic "symbol." K. revisits
 this point near the end of chapter 5, but again, all too briefly.
 K. is stronger in chapter 3, on the category of myth. K. brings in evidence from
 Sallustius, a figure somewhat less studied than his colleagues, and Plotinus, who is
 sometimes overlooked in studies of the later figures, to attest that the Neoplatonists
 view the material cosmos as, in a strong sense, a myth. The opposite observation
 was made by Coulter, who pointed out that a poetic myth in Neoplatonic under-
 standing is in some sense a whole microcosm. K. shows that the Neoplatonists from
 Plotinus forward believed the reverse to be true too. Just as a divine myth presents
 simple, atemporal, and transcendent truths in multiform, temporal, and mundane
 forms, so too the cosmos unfolds from transcendent principles into the material
 world we see around us. This side of the myth-cosmos axis emphasizes nicely the
 readability of the visible world and the deep implication of semiotic values into
 material things. K. adds the fine observation that the act of interpretation, not only
 of myths but also of the cosmos itself, is at root a movement from the temporal to
 the atemporal, from the mundane to the divine. This is a welcome observation since
 it clarifies the uniquely spiritual and anagogic power that the Neoplatonists attrib-
 uted to the act of interpretation.
 In the third chapter, K. also includes some useful consideration of terminology.
 K. does not use the term "allegorical" in describing Proclus' interpretations, since
 Proclus himself seems to prefer the term "symbolic." This is fair enough, given the
 special religious and ontological valences of the term for Proclus. But in counting
 pure frequency of usage, the term av'yvtyga and its derivatives cannot be far behind
 "symbol" in Proclus' literary interpretations. (Interestingly, as is the case for all the
 allegorists, except Heraclitus, the terms aXkkryopia and U'n6vota are not the central
 features of Proclus' "allegorical" vocabulary.)
 K.'s fourth chapter covers Proclus' theory of poetry in the fifth essay of the Com-
 mentary on the Republic, a task which Anne Sheppard has undertaken in more de-
 tail.11 K. emphasizes more strongly a psychological dimension to Proclus' theory of
 poetry, where the main aims and effects of poetry concern the human soul. The great
 poet does not simply entertain. In fact, pleasurable or delightful poetry is apt to be
 frivolous, and lead a soul astray. Great poetry instead aims to raise the soul toward a
 greater understanding of the Good and the One.
 This leads into K.'s longest chapter, concerning the theory and practice of interpre-
 tation in the sixth essay of the Republic commentary. K.'s arrangement of the material
 is solid and clear with some remarks on Proclus' methods of interpretation near the
 front, followed by an admirably detailed classification and explication of Proclus'
 10. On this whole topic, see Sheppard, "Proclus' Attitude."
 11. Sheppard, Essays.
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 strategies for reading sixteen cases from Homer that Proclus treats, including the
 theomachy, the two urns, Agamemnon's dream, and the binding of Ares and Aphro-
 dite. This is the standard fare of ancient allegorical reading-places in the text where
 Homer attributes apparently inappropriate behavior or qualities to gods or heroes.'2
 K. evaluates Proclus' readings along the axis of the literal versus the symbolic,
 and claims that Proclus is more often literal than has previously been assumed.
 There is a good point at the root of this approach, but it is obfuscated by a certain
 confusion of terminology, to which I will turn in a moment. K. divides Proclus' in-
 terpretations into three basic categories, those based on "cognitive relativity," those
 that serve a pedagogic function, and those that are symbolic. The first category, de-
 spite the awkward name, works well after the careful reconstruction of Neoplatonic
 ontology that K. has undertaken in chapter 3. "Cognitive relativity" is K.'s shorthand
 for the Neoplatonic belief that the same thing appears differently at different levels
 of existence. As we saw above, a chain of being emanating from the One manifests
 itself differently in each level it penetrates, even though it remains, ontologically,
 the "same" thing. So a divine ray that might be Apollo at the highest levels of reality
 manifests itself as the sun at a lower level in the chain. Below that, this same chain
 manifests Apollo's semi-corporeal demonic avatar, then the Apis bull, heliotropic
 flowers, and the metal gold.'3 K. gathers several of Proclus' readings of difficult
 scenes in Homer within this group, including tales of the gods' appearing in human
 form. According to K., Proclus claims that Homer is providing a realistic depiction of
 the way in which they are seen by human observers, who only see lower-order appa-
 ritions at their own level.
 K. claims that Proclus has a second strategy of explanation. Here, Proclus at-
 tributes pedagogical motivations to Homer's seemingly excessive portrayals of cer-
 tain heroic behaviors, like lust, greed, irreverence toward the gods and toward fellow
 humans. In these instances, K. demonstrates convincingly, Proclus uses arguments
 from historical context, as well as parallel references in Homer's own poems, to
 show that Homer's characters were doing nothing shameful according to the stan-
 dard of their time. K. is right to point out that such strategies-historical relativity,
 Aristarchan explication according to the maxim of "Homer from Homer," and philo-
 logical commentary-did play a role in Proclus' strategies of reading. While modern
 scholars sometimes betray the view that an allegorist who makes aggressive inter-
 pretive claims cannot, almost by definition, have had any interest in Homer's text or
 historical context, Proclus and other allegorists, like Cornutus, Pseudo-Plutarch, and
 especially Porphyry, present strong counterevidence.
 Proclus' third type of interpretation, according to K., is the symbolic. Proclus is
 likely to resort to the symbolic, in K.'s view, when the gods are depicted as being in-
 volved, among themselves, in anthropomorphic or even shameful acts. The category
 of the symbol, and it's great referential power, is alone capable of transporting us
 from such a base surface to the transcendent heights of divine meaning to which
 Homer, in Proclus' view, soars. Here we get interpretations of the binding of Ares
 12. On these topoi among many others, see F Buffilre, introduction to Heraclite, 'AllMgories
 D'Hom6re," ed. F. Buffilre (Paris, 1962), xxxi.
 13. Proclus rarely lays out the features of an entire chain systematically. The example of the sun chain
 was reconstructed from the commentaries on the Timaeus, Republic, and Parmenides.
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 and Aphrodite as the demiurge's (Hephaisto's) combining the unifying and the sepa-
 rating forces of love and strife in the cosmos, and of the Olympians' provocations in
 war as the manifestations of divine providence.
 While K.'s typology is useful in its identification of varieties of interpretive strat-
 egies based on the subject matter being interpreted, it is compromised by an odd
 insistence on maintaining the literal versus the symbolic axis of the analysis, even
 though K. is well aware that such categories become extremely complicated when
 we operate within an ontological scheme as different from our own as that of the
 Neoplatonists. For example, when Proclus claims that the judgment of Paris indi-
 cates his choice of the erotic life, how can we agree with K. that, "with the exception
 of divine names," this interpretation is literal. Should we really classify as "literal"
 Proclus' interpretation that Achilles' argument with Apollo is really an argument
 with the demonic manifestation of Apollo? or as "practically literal" his reading of
 the theomachy not as a battle of gods, but as a proof that lower avatars of the gods
 are in providential contact with human combatants? Literal in what sense? When
 supported by the architectonic ontology of Proclus, where the divinities and lower
 order entities are different manifestations on the same rays of being, one might sug-
 gest a certain "literalism" in the sense that the relationship of sign to referent is an
 ontological and not a figurative one. But this type of link is precisely what Proclus
 tends to label "symbolic." K. is well aware of this, as we have noted. Nevertheless
 the analysis returns repeatedly to this admittedly compromised opposition. Some
 more explicit questioning of the usefulness of these very distinctions in Proclus
 would have been most welcome. Just raising these issues is a useful contribution to
 the field, but the final status of K.'s main argument-that Proclus is more literal than
 we have appreciated up until now-will remain in doubt until such questions are
 answered definitively; and we are some distance away from that point.
 Why these counterintuitive claims toward literalism? K.'s larger argument is part
 of a strategy to exonerate Proclus from the charge that he is prone to making exces-
 sive interpretive leaps. In showing that Proclus has a "predilection for literal inter-
 pretation," K. hopes to shield Proclus from the dismissive treatment he has sometimes
 received, based on the charge that his interpretations are absurd. Under this rubric,
 the designations literal and symbolic acquire a normative valence, the former being
 faithful, the latter being unfaithful, to Homer's text. While the thrust of the argu-
 ment-that Proclus' interpretations merit our close attention-is admirable, this par-
 ticular method of justifying them is somewhat troublesome. Need we claim that
 Proclus' interpretations are justifiable by our own standards in order to justify study-
 ing them? One hopes that this is not the case, but some such concern seems close to
 the surface here.
 K.'s penultimate chapter restates Proclus' fourfold schematization of the types of
 poetry, perhaps the best-known feature of Proclus' literary theory. This is material
 covered in more detail by Sheppard, though K. pays more explicit attention, again, to
 Proclean psychology and ends with the welcome observation that Proclus' vision of
 the symbol veers toward negative theology. This universe saturated in semantic res-
 onances tends, ironically, to nurture a semiotics of "antirepresentation." When onto-
 logical connection replaces "likeness" as the criterion by which signs are read, then
 things that are very "unlike" a referent can still carry some arcane connection to it.
 Though K. does not make the link, the connection to Pseudo-Dionysius, and there-
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 fore to the whole history of negative theology in Christian mystical traditions, is not
 far afield here. 14
 K. closes with an apology for Proclus against a characterization of him, hardly
 still credible, as little more than a mystagogue. In this context, K. betrays a certain
 defensiveness in justifying the negative theology toward which Proclus' symbolism
 tends, saying that it is no mere irrationalism. K. neglects to enlist the supporting evi-
 dence of the long and ongoing importance of just such thinking in Christian theol-
 ogy-from Pseudo-Dionysius (who appropriated the bulk of Proclus' thought c. 500
 C.E.) to Meister Eckhart (for whom Pseudo-Dionysius' "negative way" is central) to
 the contemporary thinkers Jean-Luc Marion and Thomas Carlson15-as well as in
 continental philosophy, from Hegel (who was an admirer of Proclus) to Heidegger
 and beyond. In battling against the reductive view of Proclus as a simple irrational-
 ist, K. paints him as a rather straightforward rationalist whose religion was intellec-
 tual and not emotional. Such categories can have little serious use in describing late
 Neoplatonic thinking. To label Proclus as either a rationalist or an irrationalist at-
 tributes to him a strong stand on an issue that would not have presented itself to him
 in such terms. It is, ironically enough, to do the same thing that the allegorists' de-
 tractors attribute to them. It is to read our own philosophical concerns and interests
 into the work of a thinker who wrote long ago in a very different world.
 Peter T Struck
 University of Missouri,
 Kansas City
 14. See B. McGinn, The Foundations of Mysticism (New York, 1991), 57-61; E. R. Dodds, introduc-
 tion to Proclus' "Elements of Theology," ed. E. R. Dodds, 2d ed. (New York, 1963), xxvi-xxviii.
 15. See, J.-L. Marion, God Without Being, T A. Carlson, trans. (Chicago, 1991) and T A. Carlson,
 Indiscretion: Finitude and the Naming of God (Chicago, 1999).
